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Abstract—We propose just-in-time memoryless trust for
crowdsourced IoT services. We leverage the characteristics of
the IoT service environment to evaluate their trustworthiness.
A novel framework is devised to assess a service’s trust without
relying on previous knowledge, i.e., memoryless trust. The
framework exploits service-session-related data to offer a trust
value valid only during the current session, i.e., just-in-time
trust. Several experiments are conducted to assess the efficiency
of the proposed framework.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Miniaturization and advances in WiFi technologies have
led to the emergence of Web-enabled devices. Intercon-
nected devices are typically referred to as the Internet of
Things (IoT). More formally, IoT represents the network of
things that exchange data, essentially enabling a wide variety
of applications such as smart homes and smart cities [1]. A
potential application is a crowdsourcing platform whereby
IoT devices crowdsource services for the benefit of other
IoT devices. Crowdsourced services are generally defined
as services provided by the crowd to the crowd [2]. In
IoT service crowdsourcing, IoT devices provision services
to other nearby IoT devices. We refer to such services as
crowdsourced IoT services. IoT devices can crowdsource a
wide range of service types such as computing services [3],
green energy services [4], and WiFi hotspot services [5]. For
example, computing services involves IoT devices offering
their computational resources (service providers) to other
devices. IoT devices with limited computational capabilities
(service consumers) may request and consume such services
to perform complex tasks that may not be easily achieved
otherwise.
Crowdsourcing IoT services pose several trust-related
challenges. For instance, let us assume a crowdsourcing
environment where computing services are provided by IoT
devices [3]. In such an environment, IoT providers offer their
computing resources (CPU, memory) to perform processing
tasks for other IoT devices. A potential IoT service consumer
may have concerns regarding the service’s trust. For exam-
ple, an untrustworthy service might not protect the privacy
of the consumers’ data or provide unreliable performance.
Similarly, an IoT service provider may have concerns regard-
ing their consumers’ trustworthiness. Malicious consumers
may misuse IoT services by sending malicious software.
Such concerns can be alleviated by ascertaining the trustwor-
thiness of both the service provider and service consumer.
IoT environments, however, exhibit certain characteristics
that make assessing trust rather challenging. One crucial
challenge is the dynamic nature of IoT environments. IoT
devices are inherently expected to come and go and their ex-
istence may not be for long periods. For example, wearables
like shirts and shoes have a limited lifespans as people tend
to replace them frequently. Additionally, IoT devices can
have different owners at any given time. For instance, an IoT
shirt can be worn by different people (e.g., bothers). These
dynamic characteristics may lead to unreliable historical
records that might result in an inaccurate trust assessment.
Previous trust management frameworks relied mainly on
historical data to evaluate the trustworthiness of service
providers [6], [7]. IoT environments are highly dynamic;
i.e., new devices are deployed and removed every day [8].
New devices do not generally have prior interactions with
other IoT devices. Service consumers, as a result, may not
be able to assess the trustworthiness of services provided
by new devices. Therefore, the majority of existing trust
frameworks cannot be applied to such environments due to
the lack of historical records. We introduce the concept of
just-in-time memoryless trust to overcome these challenges.
The trustworthiness of the provider is evaluated without
relying on historical data (memoryless). We propose to
leverage the characteristics of an active IoT service session
to compute an accurate trust value for the service. As a
result, the assessment would provide an accurate measure
of a service’s trustworthiness, given a specific service ses-
sion (just-in-time). We propose a framework that assesses
the trustworthiness of IoT services using service-session-
related data. Our approach exploits existing IoT devices
(bystanders) to assess the trustworthiness of IoT services
in their vicinity. We achieve this by using a collaborative
model where users of the crowdsourcing platform are also
expected to participate in assessing the trustworthiness of the
services. In that respect, IoT devices that wish to consume
IoT services are to contribute to the platform by evaluating
IoT services for other consumers. It is worth noting that such
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Figure 1. Crowdsourcing WiFi hotspots using IoT devices.
a model is used in other popular applications, specifically in
peer-to-peer applications, such as Skype and Window 10’s
Delivery Optimization. For example, Skype users contribute
to the platform by acting as relay stations to forward calling
packets for other Skype users.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section
II presents preliminaries and problem definition. Section II
introduces our just-in-time memoryless trust management
framework. Section IV discusses the experimental results.
Section V surveys related work. Section VI concludes the
paper and highlights future work.
Motivation Scenario
We use the following motivation scenario to illustrate the
significance of our work (Fig. 1). Assume a crowdsourcing
environment where IoT devices are used to provide/consume
services to/from other IoT devices. The provided services
in this scenario are WiFi hotspots. In other words, an IoT
service provider shares their device’s Internet access using
an application like WiFiMapper1. Service providers B, C,
and D in Fig. 1 use their smartphones or smartwatches to
share their Internet with other nearby IoT devices. Service
consumer A wishes to consume one of the available nearby
services.
Service consumer A is presented with the potential service
providers B, C, and D. The available providers are unknown
to consumer A and, therefore, consumer A has no knowledge
about their trustworthiness. Additionally, service providers
B, C, and D do not have historical records that reveal
their previous behaviors. Consumer A, therefore, fails to
ascertain the level of trust from such providers. Service
provision/consumption, as a result, does not occur due to
the absence of trust. We, therefore, propose a framework
that assesses the trustworthiness of the providers despite the
lack of historical records.
1https://www.wifimap.io
It is worth noting that trust management is not limited to
WiFi hotspot services. Other IoT services require trust as-
surance prior to service consumption. For example, assume
an IoT crowdsourcing environment, whereby IoT devices
offer their computing resources (e.g., CPU and memory)
to other less-capable IoT devices [3]. Suppose an IoT
device owner A wishes to use their smartphone to provision
compute services to other nearby devices. Let us assume that
provider A has not provisioned any services before. Provider
A, therefore, lacks historical data that can describe their
performance. Assume a consumer B who has some compute
tasks to perform on their confidential data. Provider A is a
potential candidate to receive consumer B’s task. Consumer
B, however, may not use the available computing service
since provider A is unknown to them. Additionally, Provider
A does not have any previous historical records that allow
consumer C to deduce a trust value for them.
II. PRELIMINARIES AND PROBLEM DEFINITION
We model a crowdsourced IoT service S provided
and consumed by an IoT device d as a tuple of <
id, l, t, d, o, f, q > where,
• id is a unique service ID.
• l is a GPS location where the service S is provided.
• t is the time interval at which the service S is provided.
It is represented as a tuple < ts, te > , where
– ts is the start-time of S,
– te is the end-time of S.
• d is the IoT device that offers the service S (e.g.,
smartphone).
• o is the owner of the IoT device. An owner can be an
individual or any other cooperation or business (e.g.,
universities or restaurants). In this paper, we assume
that a service provider is an owner of the IoT device
(i.e., sp = o).
• f is a set of functions offered by S (e.g., providing
WiFi hotspot).
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Figure 2. The proposed framework.
• q is a set of all non-functional parameters of S (e.g.,
signal strength).
A. Problem Definition
As stated earlier, IoT environments are highly dynamic.
As a result, the majority of IoT services lack historical
records, which are generally used to ascertain their trust-
worthiness. It is, therefore, crucial to consider other aspects
of IoT services to establish their trustworthiness T . The
purpose of our work is to identify a function F that utilizes
the properties of a service’s environment ES to assess its
trust. In other words:
T ≈ F(E) (1)
III. JUST-IN-TIME MEMORYLESS TRUST MANAGEMENT
FRAMEWORK
We introduce a just-in-time memoryless trust management
framework for assessing a service’s trustworthiness without
relying on historical records (see Fig. 2). The framework
exploits the service session characteristics and its surround-
ing environment to infer the service’s trustworthiness. The
framework is divided into three phases: (1) IoT service
initiation, (2) IoT service monitoring, and (3) trustworthiness
assessment. During the IoT service initiation, an IoT service
provider decides to offer their services to nearby devices.
Nearby IoT devices monitor the performance of the service
during the IoT service monitoring phase. A new consumer
relies on existing IoT devices to build a just-in-time memo-
ryless trust value for the potential service provider.
A. IoT Service Session Initiation
A service provider Sp starts service provisioning by initi-
ating a service session Ssess. A service session is confined
by a geographical area and time duration, e.g., a coffee
place between 5:00pm and 7:00pm. Additionally, a service
session includes the type of the service being provided, e.g.,
computing service, WiFi hotspots, etc. The service provider
also broadcasts a promise vector
#  »
PS to potential nearby
IoT consumers. The promise vector describes the expected
behavior of the IoT service. For example, in WiFi hotspot
crowdsourcing, a service’s trust can be evaluated based on
the service’s speed, security, and availability. A possible
promise vector can be [10mbps,Medium, 90%]. The vector
indicates the service’s expected speed is 10mbps, security is
medium, and availability is 90%.
B. Bystanders-Based Trust Assessment
A service session Ssess is limited by space and time.
IoT consumers cannot consume the service if they are not
within the service session’s area and period. For example,
IoT consumers at a restaurant cannot consume services from
a provider at a coffee shop. Similarly, an IoT service session
running between 7:00pm and 8:00pm cannot be consumed
between 9:00pm 10:00pm. Many IoT devices may exist
within a service’s area and periods other than IoT consumers.
We refer to such devices as bystanders. More formally, we
define IoT service bystanders as the non-consumer devices
that exist within the vicinity of a service session Ssess in
terms of area and time. We leverage IoT service bystanders
to assess the trustworthiness of a service S during its session
Ssess. A set of bystanders B receive the promise vector
#  »
PS
from the service provider Sp. Additionally, the bystanders
assess the service’s performance by invoking dummy tasks
periodically. For instance, a bystander for a WiFi hotspot
service can download a file using a particular service. Each
bystander b ∈ B generates an observation vector #   »ObS based
on their task invocation. The observation vector contains
information regarding the actual performance of the service
at a specific time. For example, an observation vector
#   »
OS =
[9mbps,Medium, 80%] for a WiFi hotspot service indicates
that the service has a speed of 9mbps, a medium security
level, and 80% availability. An instantaneous trust T binst is
computed by each bystander b ∈ B using their observation
vector
#   »
ObS and the IoT service provider’s promise vector
#  »
PS . The instantaneous trust reflects the trustworthiness of
a particular provider at a time instant from a bystander’s
perspective. A bystander b ∈ B evaluates their instantaneous
trust T binst using the following equation:
T binst =
1
| #  »PS |
| #  »PS |−1∑
i=0
min
(
1,
#   »
ObS(i)
#  »
PS(i)
)
(2)
where | #  »PS | is the number of elements in the vector #  »PS , and
#   »
ObS(i) and
#  »
PS(i) are the ith elements in the vectors
#   »
ObS and
#  »
PS , respectively. The value of T binst ranges between zero
and one, one being highly trusted. For example, assume a
WiFi hotspot service provider with a promise vector
#  »
PS =
[10mbps,Medium, 90%], which represents a service with a
speed of 10mbps, Medium security, and 90% availability. In
this example, the security level can either be Low, Medium,
or High for simplicity. A representative numerical value can
then be given to the security level when used in equation
2 (0 = Low, 1 = Medium, and 2 = High). Additionally,
assume a bystander that has an observation vector
#   »
OS =
[9mbps,High, 80%]. The instantaneous trust Tinst equals
0.93 after applying equation 2.
C. Consumer-Based Trust Assessment
An IoT service provider can offer and provision its
services to more than one consumer. We exploit the set of
existing consumers C to assess their IoT provider’s trust.
Similar to IoT service bystanders, IoT consumers receive
the provider’s promise vector
#  »
PS . Consumers monitor their
providers while using the service. Unlike bystanders, con-
sumers can offer a more accurate observation of the IoT
service. Consumers perform their monitoring over peri-
ods rather than single time instances. They, therefore, can
capture the behavior of the IoT service over time more
accurately and form a better representation for the service’s
trustworthiness. Each consumer c ∈ C generates an observa-
tion vector
#   »
OcS . The observation vector is generated based on
the consumer’s experience while using the IoT service. The
elements of the vector are similar to that of the bystanders’
observation vectors; i.e., each represents one aspect of the
service’s performance. Each consumer c ∈ C computes the
accumulated trust T cacc. We define the accumulated trust
T cacc as the trustworthiness of an IoT service from the
perspective of the consumer c ∈ C over their consumption
period. Consumers keep updating their accumulated trust as
they use the service. The updated accumulated trust utilizes
earlier accumulated trust values to increase the accuracy of
the service’s trust over time. The consumer c ∈ C evaluates
the accumulated trust T cacc using the following equation:
T cacc(t+ 1) = αT
c
acc(t) + (1− α)T cinst (3)
where T cacc(t+1) is the updated accumulated trust, T
c
acc(t)
is the current accumulated trust, and α is a weighting
factor from zero to one. The T cinst is the instantaneous trust
from consumer c ∈ C’s perspective. The value of T cinst is
computed using equation 2.
D. Overall IoT Service Trust Assessment
A new consumer relies on IoT service bystanders and
existing consumers to evaluate an IoT service’s trustwor-
thiness. The accumulated and instantaneous trust values are
sent to the new consumer. The new consumer aggregates
the trust values to assess the overall trustworthiness of the
service using the following equation:
TS = 1|C|+ |B|
(∑
c∈C
T cacc +
∑
b∈B
T binst
)
(4)
where |C| is the number of existing consumers, and |B| is
the number of bystanders.
Equation 4 assesses the trust by weighting instantaneous
and accumulated trust values equally. The time at which
the instantaneous trust is evaluated should be considered. A
fresher trust value reflects the service’s trustworthiness more
accurately. Additionally, the duration that is covered by the
accumulated trust is crucial. Higher weights should be given
to accumulated trust values that cover longer periods. We,
therefore, formulate the freshness FTinst of the instantaneous
trust as follows:
FT b
inst
=
tsb
TSB
(5)
where tsb is the timestamp at which the instantaneous
trust T binst is evaluated, and TSB as the summation of all
timestamps from all bystanders in B. The freshness value
takes a value from zero to one, one indicating a newer trust
value. For example, assume three bystanders A, B, and C,
which computed the instantaneous trust at different time
instances. The three bystanders recorded the timestamp of
their observation vectors as an offset from the beginning of
the service session. Assume the timestamps are as follows:
2, 8, 20 minutes for bystanders A, B, and C, respectively.
The freshness scores for the three bystanders are 0.07, 0.27,
0.67 for bystanders A, B, and C, respectively, according to
equation 5. Bystander C has the highest freshness scores
since their computed trust is the newest among the three.
Similarly, we evaluate the coverage GTacc of the accumu-
lated trust as follows:
GT cacc =
dc
DC
(6)
where dc is the duration that is covered by the accumulated
trust, and DC is the summation of all durations covered
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Figure 3. Accuracy in detecting the instantaneous and accumulated trust
by existing consumers and bystanders.
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Figure 4. The effect of bystanders/consumers number on the accuracy
of the overall trust.
by all the consumers in C. The value of the coverage can
take a value between zero and one, where larger values
indicate the accumulated trust covered longer periods. For
instance, assume a service that is being consumed by three
consumers A, B, and C. Each consumer used the service
for different periods. Suppose that consumers A, B, and
C used the service for 45, 20, 5 minutes, respectively. The
coverage is 0.64, 0.29, and 0.07 for consumers A, B, and C,
respectively. Consumer A is awarded the highest coverage
since they used the service the longest.
We use the freshness and coverage measures in equation
4 as follows:
TS = β
∑
c∈C
GT caccT
c
acc + (1− β)
∑
b∈B
FT b
inst
T binst (7)
where β is a user-defined weighting factor between zero and
one.
In some scenarios, a bystander/consumer may report inac-
curate or wrong trust assessments to the new consumer (e.g.,
biased or malicious bystander). We introduce the credibility
measure to overcome this issue. The basic intuition is that
biased/malicious bystanders/consumers are special cases. In
other words, the majority of consumers/bystanders behave as
expected, while only a subset may produce invalid assess-
ments. We, therefore, compare the trust assessments from
different bystanders and consumers. The credibility of each
bystander/consumer can then be inferred from such compar-
ison. For example, assume, for simplicity, four bystanders
with four instantaneous trust values: 0.9, 0.85, 1.0, and 0.1.
The first three trust values are close to each other, while
the last is significantly different. It can be deduced that the
forth bystander may have invalid trust assessment since the
majority produced different values. We, therefore, evaluate
the credibility of a bystander/consumer Cb|c as follows:
Cb|c = 1− |T − Tavg| (8)
where T is the instantaneous or the accumulated trust and
Tavg is the average of all trust values from bystanders and
consumers. The credibility value takes a value between zero
and one, one indicating high credibility.
Using our earlier example, the credibilities for the four
bystanders using equation 8 are 0.8125, 0.8625, 0.7125, and
0.3875. The first three bystanders got relatively high scores
since they provide similar assessments. The fourth bystander
is given the lowest since its trust assessment deviates from
the majority.
We use the credibility of the bystanders/consumers by
applying equation 8 into equation 7 as follows:
TS = β
∑
c∈C
CcGT caccT cacc + (1− β)
∑
b∈B
CbFT b
inst
T binst (9)
IV. EXPERIMENTS
We evaluate the effectiveness of the framework in terms of
accuracy. More specifically, we examine the accuracy of the
just-in-time memoryless trust for IoT services. Additionally,
we evaluate the accuracy of the instantaneous and accumu-
lated trust discussed in Section II. We run the experiments on
a 3.60GHz Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-7700 and 8 GB of RAM.
A. Dataset Description
Amazon Mechanical Turk2 (MTruk) is used to collect
the dataset for our experiments. We divided MTurk workers
into three categories: bystanders, existing consumers, and
new consumers. Workers in all categories are asked to
assume that they are at a public place, e.g., a restaurant,
where other nearby users are sharing their Internet via WiFi
hotspots using smartphones and smartwatches. In such an
environment, potential consumers can use an application on
their smartphones/smartwatches to get a list of nearby WiFi
hotspots. Each provider in the application sets its expected
2https://www.mturk.com/
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Figure 6. The effect of credibility on the trust accuracy.
performance, i.e., promise vector. Each worker is presented
with a specific WiFi hotspot, with its promise vector.
Workers in the bystanders’ category are asked to assume
that they are given some monetary rewards to monitor
the performance of service providers. Monitoring is carried
out by using the service at specific time instances and
recording their actual performance, i.e., observation vector.
The performance of the service at different timestamps is
given to the workers. The workers are asked to rate the
service based on the given performance.
Existing consumes category consists of workers that are
treated as current consumers for the presented service.
Similar to bystanders category, workers in this category are
presented with a list of performance records of the service,
i.e., observation vector. Each performance record represents
the performance of the service during a period rather than at
timestamps. The workers are asked to rate the service based
on the given performance.
Workers in the new consumers’ category are those who
wish to compute the just-in-time memoryless trust. Each
worker is presented with two lists of ratings. The first list
represents the service’s ratings from consumers who use it.
The second list contains bystanders who monitor the service
and report their ratings. The workers are asked to consider
the ratings from both lists and give an expected rate for the
service.
All workers are asked to give their rating for the services
as a value between zero to ten, ten being the highest. The
data has been collected using the results from a total of 5000
workers for each category.
B. Experimental Results
We use precision, recall, and accuracy [9] to determine
the efficiency of our work. We assume that trust can be
at one of three levels: highly trusted, moderately trusted,
and lowly trusted. Given a trust level l, e.g., moderately
trusted, precision l is defined as the ratio between the number
of samples correctly detected as l to the total number of
samples detected as l:
Precisionl =
|correctl|
|detectedl| (10)
Recall for l is the ratio between the correctly detected
samples as l to the total number of actual l samples:
Recalll =
|correctl|
|actuall| (11)
The accuracy in detecting l is the ratio between the
number of correctly detected samples as l and the number
of correctly detected samples as not l to the total samples
number:
Accuracyl =
|correctl|+ |correct notl|
|samples| (12)
The first experiment set evaluates the overall accuracy of
the whole framework, see Fig. 5. The framework achieves
high accuracy, precision, and recall scores: 88.40%, 82.78%,
and 82.54%, respectively. The second experiment evaluates
the credibility measure influence on the accuracy scores.
Fig. 6 shows the results for this experiment. The frame-
work scores higher in terms of accuracy (around 88.40%)
when the credibility measure is used. The accuracy of
the framework reduces significantly when the credibility of
the bystander/consumer is not considered (around 59.03%).
Recall that the credibility measures the truthfulness of the
trust values provided by the bystanders/consumers. The
measure is used to weight the significance of the reported
trust from the bystanders/consumers. The absence of the
credibility results in treating all reported trust values equally.
As a result, biased/malicious bystanders and consumers can
greatly disrupt the accuracy of the assessed trust as evident
in Fig. 8.
The overall trust value of the service is computed based
on the instantaneous and accumulated trust. We evaluate
the accuracy in assessing such trust values in the next
experiment (see Fig. 3. The accuracy in computing the
instantaneous trust is around 85.04%, whereas a higher
accuracy is achieved when evaluating the accumulated trust;
around 90.31%. The accumulated trust has higher accuracy
due to how it is computed. The instantaneous trust is
computed from a single observation vector given a specific
timestamp. However, computing the accumulated trust uti-
lizes previously computed instantaneous trust values to get
a more accurate assessment for the service.
The last experiment studies the effect of the number of
bystanders/consumers on the overall trust of the service.
Fig. 4 shows the results for this experiment. The accuracy
of the framework has significantly lower scores when a
small number of bystanders and consumers is considered.
For example, the accuracy is around 20% when only one
bystander or consumer is used. The accuracy increases
exponentially as the number of bystanders and consumers
increases. High accuracy scores are reached when six by-
standers/consumers are considered (about 82%). A lower
number of bystanders/consumers might not represent the
actual service trustworthiness accurately. For example, bi-
ased/malicious bystanders/consumers have a greater influ-
ence when the total number of bystanders/consumer is low.
As a result, the computed trust value does not accurately
represent the service’s actual trustworthiness.
V. RELATED WORK
Trust assessment in crowdsourced IoT service environ-
ment is fairly new. Most of the proposed approaches can
be grouped into two main categories: previous experiences-
based trust evaluation, and social networks-based trust
evaluation.
A. Measuring Trust Using Previous Experiences
A centralized trust management system (TMS) is pro-
posed to evaluate the trustworthiness of an IoT device
based on its past behavior [6]. The TMS has four phases:
information gathering, entity selection, transaction and eval-
uation, and learning. The information gathering phase in-
volves collecting data about the executed services by the
IoT device. In the entity selection phase, the TMS returns
the most trustworthy IoT device for requested services.
Performing the task by the IoT service provider happens at
the transaction and evaluation phase. The requester gives a
score to the provider based on the executed service outcome.
In the learning phase, the TMS learns the credibility of the
requesters to weight their scores. While TMS performed well
according to the conducted experiments, their choice of a
centralized solution may act as a bottleneck.
A trust model is proposed for evaluating the trustworthi-
ness and reputation of nodes in Wireless Sensor Networks
(WSNs) [7]. The node’s reputation is computed based on
its performance characteristics: packet delivery, forwarding
ratio, and energy consumption. The reputation is later used
to evaluate the trustworthiness of the node. The proposed
model uses WSN-specific characteristics (e.g., packet deliv-
ery which makes it unsuitable for other applications).
Social IoT network is used to measure the trust be-
tween two IoT devices in [10]. A social IoT network is
a type of social networks where nodes are IoT devices.
Relationships between IoT devices indicate one or more
of the following relations: similar owner, co-location, co-
work, social relation, or brand. Each node computes the
trust of its friends. The trust is measured based on the
individual’s and friends’ previous experiences. A trust model
is also proposed in [11] that uses social IoT to manage the
interactions between IoT service consumers and providers.
The social IoT network is used to search for candidate
service providers. Reputation-based trustworthiness is used
to evaluate the service providers using previous interactions.
A trust management protocol is proposed in [12] [13] to
assess the trustworthiness of IoT devices based on honesty,
cooperativeness, and community-interest. Honesty is mea-
sured using the direct observation of an IoT device (high
recommendation discrepancy, delays, etc.). Cooperativeness
and community-interest are computed using data from so-
cial networks. Common friends between two IoT owners
indicate high cooperativeness between their IoT devices.
Community-interest depends on the common communities
number between two IoT owners. A framework is proposed
for crowdsourcing services to IoT devices based on their
mobility and trustworthiness [14]. A central authority exists
to manage interactions between the consumer and provider.
The trustworthiness of a service provider is computed based
on their reputation. Basically, when the central authority
receives a task request from the consumer, the task is
submitted to multiple service providers. The server then
computes the anomalies among the results from the service
providers. Service providers with deviated results are marked
and their reputation is decreased.
Aforementioned approaches use historical data (i.e., pre-
vious experiences) to asses the trust. On the other hand, one
key characteristic of crowdsourced IoT service environments
is their high dynamism in terms of IoT devices deployment.
Every day a large number of IoT services are being added.
Newly added services do not have previous records. If those
previous experiences are missing, the evaluated trust cannot
be accurate. Therefore, these approaches cannot be utilized
to accurately measure IoT services’ trust.
B. Measuring Trust Using Social Networks
A social compute cloud framework is proposed in [15]
where users in a social network can share and consume
services from other users. The framework leverages the
social structure of the network. Relation types between
users (e.g., family, colleagues, etc.) are also utilized to
determine the level of trust between them. A framework
is proposed in [16] that aims at eliminating the privacy
risks accompanied with public WiFi hotspots. Social WiFi
utilizes social networks relationships to match hotspot users
to trusted hotspot providers. The proposed framework lacks
generality as it can only be used for WiFi hotspot services.
An approach for evaluating the trust between users in
social networks is presented in [17]. Behavioral interactions
are used to indicate the level of trust (i.e., conversations
between users and message propagation). A conversation
between two users can indicate a higher level of trust if: (1)
it happens many times, (2) it lasts for a long duration, and
(3) there is a balanced contribution of messages from both
users. The message propagation indicates the willingness of
a user B to forward a message received by another user
A. A large number of forwarded messages reflect a higher
trust value for the sender. The above work focuses on social
networks’ relationships which is not sufficient to evaluate
the trust between the IoT service provider and consumer. For
example, two friends on a social network do not necessitate
mutual trust between them [18].
VI. CONCLUSION
We presented just-in-time memoryless trust, a trust eval-
uation specifically suited for IoT services. The just-in-time
memoryless trust accounts for the high dynamism exhibited
in IoT environments. Such a dynamic nature causes the lack
of historical records, a crucial cornerstone for computing the
trustworthiness in the majority of existing trust management
frameworks. A novel framework was proposed to measure
IoT services’ trustworthiness without relying on previous
historical data. The framework exploits session-related data
to assess the trustworthiness of IoT services. More specif-
ically, we leverage the experience of IoT bystanders and
consumers to build an accurate trust value for a given IoT
service. The proposed framework achieved high accuracy
scores in our experiments. Future directions can be investi-
gating the trustworthiness of the IoT service consumer.
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